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ABSTRACT
IMF lending practices respond to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy
variables.  Specifically, the sizes and frequencies of loans are influenced by a country’s presence at the
Fund, as measured by the country’s share of quotas and professional staff.  IMF lending is also sensitive
to a country’s political and economic proximity to some major shareholding countries of the IMF -- the
United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  We measured political proximity by voting
patterns in the United Nations and economic proximity by bilateral trading volumes.  These results are
of considerable interest for their own sake but also provide instrumental variables for estimating the
effects of IMF lending on economic performance.  Instrumental estimates indicate that the size of IMF
lending is insignificantly related to economic growth in the contemporaneous five-year period but has a
significantly negative effect in the subsequent five years.
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rbarro@harvard.eduParticipation in programs of the International Monetary Fund has become a 
common choice for many countries in recent decades.  Almost all developing countries 
have received IMF financial support at least once since 1970.  The few exceptions include 
Botswana, Iran, Malaysia, and Paraguay.  Therefore, one question is why so many countries 
have sought financial assistance from the IMF.  Under what circumstances is a country 
more willing to come to the IMF for assistance and is the IMF more likely to agree on a 
loan?  When would a country benefit from participation in an IMF financial arrangement? 
This paper addresses these questions.  We investigate the determination and effects 
of IMF programs by using a cross-country panel data set, which comprises information on 
130 countries over the last three decades. 
A number of studies, surveyed in Knight and Santaella (1997) and Bird and 
Rowlands (2001), have investigated the determination of IMF financial arrangements.  This 
paper extends this work by including influences from institutional and political variables.   
We find that each member country’s political connections to the IMF affect the probability 
and size of an IMF loan.  We gauge these political connections by institutional and 
geopolitical variables, including the size of a country’s quota and national staff at the IMF.  
We also consider each country’s political and economic proximity to some major 
shareholding countries of the IMF—the United States, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom.  
The quota determines each country’s voting power at the IMF.  The national staff 
variable is the share of own nationals among IMF economists.  We find that higher values 
of both of these variables tend to raise the probability and size of IMF lending.  Thus,   2
greater influence in and connections to the IMF seem to matter for the IMF’s lending 
decisions. 
A member country’s political and economic proximity to the IMF’s major 
shareholding countries would be important for lending policy if the major countries exert 
influence on the IMF’s decisions.  In particular, these major countries would tend to lobby 
for loans for countries to which they are linked by political or economic interests. 
We measure a country’s political proximity to the United States by the percentage 
of times that the country voted in the U.N. General Assembly along with the United States.  
As a proxy for a country’s economic proximity to the United States, we use the share of 
bilateral trade with the United States in each country’s GDP.  We construct analogous 
political and economic linkage variables for the IMF’s major European shareholders, 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  We find that the measures of political and 
economic connections to the United States and, to a lesser degree, to the major European 
countries play significant roles in raising the probability and size of IMF lending.  Hence, 
as an international organization influenced by the power of its major shareholding countries, 
the IMF apparently takes politics into account when making decisions on loans. 
This political-economy analysis of IMF decision-making is of considerable interest for 
its own sake.  However, we also use this analysis to form instrumental variables to use to 
estimate the effects of IMF lending on a country’s economic performance. 
 Since its creation in 1944 at Bretton Woods, the role of the International Monetary 
Fund and the effectiveness of its programs have been controversial.  The IMF has claimed 
to have contributed to the sustainable growth of its member countries by maintaining the   3
stability of the international exchange and financial system and by providing financial 
support and policy advice.  However, critics say that the IMF has expanded its activities 
into too many unproductive areas and perhaps caused more harm than good.  They argue 
that the availability of IMF financial support often permits governments to pursue 
inappropriate policies longer than they otherwise would (Bandow and Vasquez, [1994]).  
IMF programs are often asserted to be “anti-growth” and to hurt, especially, poor nations.  
For example, IMF policies were claimed to make recessions only “deeper, longer, and 
harder” (Stiglitz [2000]).  The availability of IMF lending has also been depicted as a 
source of “limitless bailouts” and “moral hazard” (Barro [1998]). 
The critical issue is whether participation in an IMF program helps a country to 
improve its living standard in the long run.  To gain more understanding of this issue, this 
study investigates the effects of IMF financial arrangements on economic growth.  Many 
studies have used cross-country data to assess the economic effects of IMF programs.  
These studies have encountered a number of difficulties.  The central problem is the 
separation of the effects of IMF programs from those of other factors.  Program 
participation typically applies to countries that self-select themselves based on their economic 
and political circumstances.  Specifically, countries that are experiencing economic difficulties 
tend to turn to the IMF for help, and it would be unfair to blame the IMF for these pre-existing 
conditions.  Previous studies have tried to control for the endogeneity of IMF programs in 
various ways, but we do not regard these attempts as successful.  
Our study extends the existing literature in the procedure for controlling for the 
endogeneity of IMF lending.  In our cross-country econometric framework, we use as   4
instrumental variables the sizes of IMF quotas and professional staff and the political and 
economic proximity to the United States and three major European countries.  If we do not 
instrument, then we find that an increase in IMF lending is associated with a contemporaneous 
reduction of economic growth.  However, after controlling for endogeneity with our 
instrumental variables, we find no statistically significant impact of IMF lending on economic 
growth in the contemporaneous five-year period.  However, after controlling for endogeneity, 
we find that IMF lending has a statistically significant negative effect on growth in the 
subsequent five years.  Our results contrast with the findings of recent studies that use other 
procedures, but not good instrumental variables, to take account of endogeneity.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I provides a brief discussion of the 
characteristics of the IMF and its financial programs.  Section II assesses the determinants of 
IMF loan sizes, the frequency of participation in IMF programs, and the probability of IMF 
loan approval.  We study these processes by using Tobit and probit specifications for a cross-
country panel.  Section III presents evidence on the effects of IMF programs on economic 
growth.  Concluding observations follow in Section IV.   
 
I. The Characteristics of the IMF and its Financial Arrangements 
1.1. The Organization of the IMF  
The IMF has become an almost universal financial institution, with its membership 
rising from 44 states in 1946 to 183 at present.  However, the members of the IMF do not 
have an equal voice, unlike the General Assembly of the United Nations.  Each member 
country of the IMF contributes a quota subscription, as a sort of credit-union deposit to the   5
IMF.  Upon joining the Fund, a country pays 25 percent of its quota in the form of 
international currencies or SDRs and the remaining 75 percent in its own currency.  The 
IMF’s total resources amounted to SDR 217 billion ($279 billion) in August 2001.
1  The 
quota is the basis for determining voting power:  each member has 250 basic votes plus one 
additional vote for each SDR 100,000 of quota.  The initial quotas of the original members 
were determined at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.  The allocation was based 
mainly on economic size, as measured by national income and external trade volume.  
Quotas of new members have been determined by similar principles.  
The IMF charter calls for general quota reviews at intervals of not more than five 
years.  These reviews allow for adjustments of quotas to reflect changes in economic power. 
There have been 12 general reviews since 1950, and 6 of these resulted in an increase in the 
total size of quotas.  Most of these overall increases featured equi-proportional increases of 
quotas for the individual members (IMF [1998]).  
The highest decision-making body of the IMF is the Board of Governors, which 
consists of one governor and one alternate for each member country.  The Governors are 
usually ministers of finance or sometimes heads of central banks of the member countries.  
The Board of Governors delegates all except certain reserved powers to an Executive Board, 
which makes the daily decisions.  There are 24 Executive Directors.  Eight Executive 
Directors are appointed by the largest eight shareholders—the United States (37,149 
million SDRs or 17.5% percent of the total IMF quotas), Japan (6.3% percent), Germany 
                                                 
1 In 1969 the IMF created the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as a supplement to existing reserve assets.  The 
currency value of the SDR is determined daily by the IMF from the market exchange rates of a basket of five 
major currencies.   6
(6.1%), France (5.1%), the United Kingdom (5.1%), Saudi Arabia (3.3%), China (3.0%), 
and Russia (2.8%).  The others are elected by sixteen groupings of the remaining countries. 
The major shareholders have strong influences on the IMF’s main decisions.  Many 
important decisions require special voting majorities of 85 percent.  Hence, the United 
States alone and a group of three European countries together have veto power at the IMF.  
Although the managing director has traditionally been a European, the United States seems 
to have exerted the strongest voice at the IMF and has sometimes openly wielded this 
power to influence decisions.   
As of December 31, 1999, the IMF had a staff of 2297—693 assistant staff and 
1604 professional staff.  About two-thirds of the professional staff were economists (IMF 
[2000, p.95]).  The staff reflects the IMF’s membership, coming from about 120 countries, 
but is concentrated in advanced countries.  In 1999, among all professional staff, about 29% 
were from the United States and Canada and about 33% were from Western Europe. 
Among developing countries, India, China, Argentina, Peru, and Pakistan had relatively 
large numbers of professional staff.  
 
1.2. IMF Financial Policies and Facilities 
The basic conception of the IMF’s role, as envisioned at Bretton Woods in 1944, 
was to guard an “adjustable peg exchange rate system” and provide short-term finance to 
deal with temporary current-account deficits in advanced countries.  Thus, with the 
breakdown of the par adjustable peg system in 1973, the IMF lost its major role as the 
guarantor of fixed exchange rates among advanced countries.  Nevertheless, the IMF did   7
not disappear, and its role expanded instead into many new areas.  The collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system was followed by oil price shocks, which led to severe payments 
imbalances for a large number of developing countries.  After the developing countries 
recovered from the debt crisis of the 1980s, other problems arose, including the transitions 
of the former Communist countries and the Asian financial crisis.  Eventually, the IMF 
evolved into the “crisis manager” and “development financier” for developing countries.
2    
The primary role of the IMF is to provide credits to member countries in balance-of-
payments difficulties.  Part of the credit is provided in relation to the quota of a member 
country.  The first tranche, 25% of the quota, is available automatically, without entailing 
any discussion of policy.  The use of IMF resources beyond the first tranche almost always 
requires an arrangement between the IMF and the member country.  Under an IMF 
arrangement, the amount of resources committed is released in quarterly installments, 
subject to the observance of policy benchmarks and performance criteria.  This process is 
often referred to as conditionality. 
Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) are the main 
IMF programs designed to provide short-term balance-of-payments assistance to member 
countries.
3  The typical Stand-By Arrangement covers a period of 1 to 2 years, with 
repayments scheduled between 3 
1/4 and 5 years from the date of the borrowing.  The 
Extended Fund Facility program, introduced in 1974, was intended to provide somewhat 
                                                 
2 See Krueger (1998) and Bordo and James (2000) for detailed discussions of the changing role of the IMF. 
 
3 A number of other short-term IMF arrangements have been introduced to supplement SBA and EFF.  These 
arrangements include the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), the Country Stabilization Fund (CSF), the 
Compensatory and Contingent Financing Facility (CCFF), and the Systematic Transformation Facility (STF).  
See IMF (1998) for details.   8
longer-term financing in larger amounts.  The EFF arrangement typically lasts up to 3 years, 
with repayments scheduled over a period of 4 
1/2 to 10 years. 
The SBA and EFF programs did not cover very low-income countries.  Confronted 
by increasing pressure, the IMF developed several new lending programs to provide long-
term loans at subsidized interest rates for poor countries.  The Fund established the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF) in 1987.  The interest rate charged is 0.5%, and repayments are scheduled 
over 5-10 years after a 5-year grace period.  Most ESAF cases were with sub-Saharan 
African countries and former planned economies.  In 1999, the ESAF was replaced by the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  Probably these activities should be 
viewed more as foreign aid, rather than lending or adjustment programs.    
Table 1 shows the number and amounts approved for all types of IMF programs 
over the period 1970 to 2000.
4  Over the last three decades, a total of 725 programs were 
approved.  This total includes 594 short-term and mid-term stabilization programs (SBA 
and EFF), which are the focus of our analysis.  The number of these short-term programs 
peaked in the early 1980s with the Latin American debt crisis.  Although the number 
declined subsequently, the average size of the loans jumped because of the financial crises 
experienced by larger countries, such as Mexico, South Korea, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, 
and Turkey. 
 
                                                 
4 The amount of loan approved was not always drawn by the member country.  This situation can arise if the 
IMF terminated the arrangement because the borrower did not meet the conditionality, or if the country ended 
up not using its full allotment.  Sometimes a country utilized an IMF program to build credibility and did not 
use the borrowing facility at all.   9
II. Determination of IMF Program Approval and Participation    
2.1. Determinants of IMF Financial Arrangements   
Participation in an IMF program is a joint decision between a member country and 
the IMF.  Countries that are experiencing economic difficulties come to the IMF for a 
financial arrangement. Then the IMF determines whether the country meets the Fund’s 
criteria for approval.  
To capture the economic determinants of IMF lending, we use a number of standard 
variables that can be found in the previous literature.  Some of these factors can be viewed 
as influences on a country’s demand for loans and others as effects on the IMF’s 
willingness to supply loans.  The variables included for each country and time period are 
the level of international reserves in relation to imports, per capita GDP, the lagged growth 
rate of GDP, and a dummy variable for whether a country is one of the rich OECD 
countries.
5  
                                                 
5 Previous studies, such as Conway (1994) and Knight and Santaella (1997), include other measures of 
economic performance, such as current-account deficits and inflation.  We found that, once lagged GDP 
growth and international reserves were considered, these variables did not contribute significantly to the 
explanation of IMF lending.  It is also likely that the occurrence of a currency or banking crisis induces 
countries to seek IMF financial support.  However, the appearance of these crises cannot be regarded as 
exogenous to other economic events (see, for example, Frankel and Rose [1996]).  Because of the 
endogeneity of the crises, we did not include crisis dummy variables as explanatory variables for IMF lending.  
If we add a dummy variable for the presence of a currency crisis to the regressions, it has statistically 
significant positive effects on the probability and size of IMF lending.  However, no substantial changes occur 
in the estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables that we consider.  A dummy variable for 
banking crises turns out to be statistically insignificant, once the currency-crisis dummy is included.  Note 
that IMF lending does not, by any means, accompany every currency crisis.  Since 1970 only one-third of 
currency-crisis observations were linked with IMF program participation in the same year or one year later 
(see Park and Lee [2001]).  On the other side, many IMF programs occur in the absence of a currency crisis.  
Hutchison (2001) notes that, in a sample of 67 developing countries over the period 1975-97, only 18% of 
IMF program participation observations were associated with currency crises.   
   10 
The key innovation of our analysis is that we model the IMF as a bureaucratic and 
political organization.  Hence, we include additional explanatory variables to reflect this 
perspective.  We include two measures of connection and influence with the IMF—the 
sizes of a country’s IMF quota and professional staff.  Then we include geopolitical 
variables that measure a country’s political and economic proximity to major shareholding 
countries of the IMF.  These variables are based on patterns of U.N. voting and bilateral 
trade flows. 
The first institutional variable is the country’s share of IMF quotas.  This share 
reflects a country’s voting power and also matters directly for a portion of the lending 
available to a member.  Our hypothesis is that, for given economic conditions, a higher 
country quota raises the probability and size of an IMF loan. 
The second institutional variable is the share of a country’s nationals among the 
IMF professional staff of economists.  Officially, to avoid conflicts of interest, the IMF 
does not allow staff members to have direct influence on lending decisions for their home 
countries.  Item 24 of the IMF Code of Conduct for Staff states:  “The IMF will seek to 
avoid assigning nationals to work on policy issues relating specifically to IMF relations 
with their home country, unless needed for linguistic or other reasons.”  However, from the 
standpoint of having good information, the IMF would often like the input from the 
nationals of a target country.  Therefore, although own nationals cannot work directly as 
desk economists or mission team members for their home countries, these nationals are 
often sought out for comments on country programs.  In addition, the presence of own 
nationals on the staff can help a country to get more access to inside information and,   11 
thereby, make it easier to negotiate with the IMF on the terms of a program.  Thus, overall, 
our hypothesis is that, for given economic conditions, a larger national staff at the IMF 
raises the probability and size of a loan. 
We measure the national staff for each country by the number of home-country 
nationals currently working for the Fund.  Unfortunately, we lack the information to refine 
the staff data to consider ranks of positions.  Also, it would be interesting to consider the 
number of ex IMF staff economists who currently work in the governments of the various 
countries.  However, we lack the information to make this extension. 
One concern is that IMF quota and staff might reflect a member country’s size, 
rather than political connections, per se.  Therefore, our empirical analysis of IMF lending 
also includes a direct measure of the size of the country—the level and square of the log of 
total GDP. 
 Another concern is that the number of country nationals on the IMF staff is 
endogenously determined by the country’s involvement with IMF programs, rather than 
vice versa.  However, the effect of a country’s IMF program experience seems, in practice, 
not to have a large impact on hiring of that country’s nationals.  In particular, the 
distribution of IMF staff by country is a highly persisting variable.  The correlation between 
the values in 1985 and in 1995 is 0.97 (0.91 in the sample of developing countries).  For 
this reason, lagged program participation turns out to lack explanatory power for the size of 
the national staff.
6   
                                                 
6 If we run a regression with the log of IMF staff share as the dependent variable, the significant explanatory 
variable, aside from the log of the lagged staff share, is the log of the IMF quota share.  The estimated 
coefficient on a measure of lagged program participation is positive but statistically insignificant.   12 
Similarly, there could be a concern that a country’s quota was endogenous, although 
the tie to a country’s past program experience would seem doubtful in this case.  In any 
event, quotas are extremely persistent over time, with much of the allocations determined 
by the rules set out in 1944 at Bretton Woods.  
The IMF is also a political organization governed by its major shareholders.  For 
example, a common claim is that the IMF plays the roles best suited to the national interests 
of the United States.  In the Cold War era, the IMF often supported countries—such as 
Argentina, Egypt, and Zaire—that were important to the United States for foreign policy 
reasons, despite the absence of effective reforms (see Krueger [1998] and Bordo and James 
[2000]).  In the 1994 Mexican crisis, the IMF stand-by program was of unprecedented scale, 
amounting to $17.8 billion or 688 percent of Mexican’s quota at the IMF.  No doubt this 
loan resulted from the intense high-level diplomacy between the U.S. government and the 
IMF.  In one incident, the Clinton Administration exerted such strong pressure for rapid 
action that the usual minimal notice to Executive Directors was not given.  Hence, in 
protest, some European executive directors abstained in the voting (Krueger [1998]).   
We use as a proxy for a country’s political proximity to the United States the 
fraction of the votes that each country cast in the U.N. General Assembly along with the 
United States.
7  We constructed analogous variables for France, Germany, and the United 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
7We compiled data for 1975-85 on voting patterns in the United Nations from the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research of the University of Michigan.  We then updated from on-line data available 
at the United Nations (unbisnet.un.org).   The variable that measures the political proximity with the United 
States is the fraction of times that the United States and the country in question voted identically (either both 
voting yes, both voting no, or both voting abstention [or non-participation]) in all General Assembly plenary 
votes in a given year.  Decisions adopted without votes and votes in which the country in question was not 
eligible to participate were excluded.  The results reported below do not change qualitatively if we use some   13 
Kingdom.  Our hypothesis is that greater political proximity to the United States or the 
European countries will raise the probability and size of IMF lending programs. 
An analogous U.N. voting variable has been used to explain foreign-aid patterns in 
research by Ball and Johnson (1996) and Alesina and Dollar (2000).  A recent study by 
Thacker (1999) used a U.N. voting variable to investigate the U.S. influence over the IMF’s 
lending decisions.
8    
We measure economic proximity to the United States by the ratio of the country’s 
bilateral trade with the United States to the country’s GDP.  We construct analogous 
variables for the three Western European countries.  Our hypothesis is that greater trade 
relations with the United States or the European countries will raise the probability and size 
of IMF loan programs.
9  
 
2.2. Empirical Framework 
We have compiled data from 1975 to 1999.  Although data are available for most 
variables and countries on an annual basis, we do not have annual observations for the IMF 
staff, which was obtained at five-year frequencies.  Since we thought that little information 
                                                                                                                                                     
alternative measures, for example, if we exclude non-participation or abstention. 
 
8 Thacker used only “key” U.N. votes, as designated by the U.S. Treasury.  He then constructed the fraction of 
the votes on these key issues that each country cast in the U.N. General Assembly along with the United 
States.  One problem with this procedure is that the designation of which votes are key is subjective.  In any 
event, we could not apply this approach because the U.S. Treasury information is available only since 1983, 
and we also lack analogous information for the European countries.  Thacker found that the level of his U.N. 
voting variable was not significantly related to IMF lending.  However, the first difference of his variable had 
a significantly positive effect.  We do not find this pattern with our specification and sample period.  
  
9 Thacker (1999) and Bird and Rowlands (2001) used U.S. exports to each member country as an explanatory 
variable for IMF lending decision.  They found unexpected negative coefficients. 
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would be gained from annual observations, we arranged all of the data at five-year intervals.  
Hence, our panel covers 130 countries over the five five-year periods 1975-79, 1980-84, 
1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-99.  The panel is unbalanced with a total of 603 
observations.
10 
We measure IMF loan program participation in three ways:  loan size, participation, 
and approval.  The loan size variable is the period-average of the ratio of IMF loans to GDP, 
all measured in U.S. dollars.  Participation in an IMF program is the fraction of months 
during each five-year period that a country operated under an IMF loan program.  Thus, 
participation varies (almost) continuously between zero and one.  Approval is a binary 
variable indicating that there was at least one new agreement on lending between the IMF 
and a member country during a five-year period.  Thus, the program approval variable 
equals one if the IMF and the country made an agreement at any time during the five years.  
In this paper, we consider only the short-term IMF stabilization programs (SBA and EFF).  
As discussed before, there are substantial differences between stabilization programs and 
structural programs.   
Using the size of IMF loans as the dependent variable, we specify a Tobit model to 
take account of the censoring of the dependent variable at zero.  The model is specified as  
 
(1)   it t it it it u time Z X L + + + + = * * δ γ β α , 
(2)   *] , 0 max[ it it L L = , 
where the dependent variable, Lit, is the loan-size variable for country i during period t.   
                                                 
10 The sample excludes the countries that lacked  IMF membership during each five-year period.      15 
Lit =0 applies if the country did not have a loan agreement with the IMF during period t.  
The vector Xit denotes the country-specific economic factors that influence the existence 
and size of IMF programs.  This vector includes the ratio of foreign reserves to imports, per 
capita GDP, total GDP, lagged GDP growth, and the dummy for the group of advanced 
OECD countries.
11  The regression also includes period dummies (time) to control for 
common effects of external factors such as world interest rates.  The vector Zit comprises 
the institutional and geopolitical factors that measure each country’s political-economy 
connections to the IMF—the share of IMF quotas and staff, the political proximity to the 
United States and the European countries (based on the U.N. voting patterns), and the 
intensity of trade with the United States and the European countries.  The variable uit is a 
random error term. 
An evaluation of IMF program participation also requires a censored-regression 
framework.  The Tobit equation is specified as 
 
(3)   it t it it it u time Z X F + + + + = * * δ γ β α , 
(4)   *)] , 0 max( , 1 min[ it it F F = , 
 
where Xit, Zit, and time are defined as before.  The dependent variable, Fit, is the fraction of 
time for which country i participated in an IMF program during period t. 
                                                 
11 This group consists of the countries other than Turkey that have been members of the OECD since the 
1970s. 
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Although loan size and IMF program participation are continuous variables, 
program approval is a binary choice variable. In this case, we use a probit specification: 
 
(5)   it t it it it u time Z X I + + + + = * * δ γ β α , 
(6)  










The dependent variable, Iit, equals one if country i made at least one loan agreement with 
the IMF during period t and equals zero otherwise.   
The specifications in equations (1)-(6) can be viewed as reduced-form models that 
reflect the demand for and supply of IMF loans.  To minimize reverse-causality problems, 
all explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of each period or as lagged values. 
We have tried various functional forms for each model and selected the ones that 
delivered the best goodness-of-fit.  It turns out that per capita GDP and the log of GDP each 
enter as quadratics.  The IMF quota share, the IMF staff share, the U.N. voting variables, 
and the bilateral-trade-share variables enter as their log values.
12  
The Tobit and probit estimation models apply to the panel data set of 130 countries 
over the five five-year periods from 1975 to 1999.  To estimate these systems, we use a 
random-effects specification for the error terms.  Our reasoning is that a country that is 
                                                 
12 To keep the zero observations when making the log transformations, we added 0.0009 to each observation 
of staff share, 0.0002 to each observation of quota share, and 0.0001 to each observation of bilateral trade 
share.  These values are the minimum non-zero observations for staff share, quota share, and bilateral trade 
share in the sample.  The results are not sensitive to the specific values added for the log transformations.    17 
favored by the IMF in one period—due to unexplained factors—is likely to be similarly 
favored in other periods.
13  We have also estimated pooled Tobit or probit models in which 
a robust variance matrix is used to account for any within-country correlation of the error 
terms over time.  With this alternative specification, the statistical significance of the 
political-economy variables, especially the IMF staff share, rises substantially.  The likely 
reason is that the random-effects terms pick up a lot of the explanatory power of variables, 
such as the shares of IMF staff and quotas, that tend to persist over time for a given country. 
The summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2.  Over the sample 
period, the average size of an IMF loan (including the zeroes) was 0.6% of GDP.  Countries 
on average participated in an IMF financial arrangement 19% of the time, and 36% of the 
observations (for five-year periods) featured at least one IMF program approval. 
 
2.3. Estimation Results for IMF Lending 
Table 3 presents estimation results for the Tobit equation for IMF loan size 
(equations [1] and [2]).  Consider first the results in columns 1-4.  Column 1 excludes all 
political-economy variables.  Column 2 includes the IMF staff share and the U.N. voting 
and trade intensity variables associated with the United States.  Column 3 substitutes the 
IMF quota share for the IMF staff share.  Column 4 includes all four of these political-
economy variables.  
                                                 
13Random-effects Tobit or probit models assume strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables (see 
Wooldridge [2002]). 
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The lagged growth rate of GDP is significantly negative in all of the specifications.  
The estimated coefficient in column 4 implies that, holding other variables constant, a 
decline in GDP growth by 1 percentage point per year would increase the ratio of IMF 
lending to GDP by 0.16 percentage point.  
The ratio of international reserves to imports is also significantly negative in all of 
the specifications.  The estimated coefficient in column 4 implies that a decrease in reserves 
by one month of imports would raise the ratio of IMF lending to GDP by 0.2 percentage 
point.   
The IMF loan size has a non-linear relationship with per capita GDP.  In all 
specifications, the level is significantly positive and the square is significantly negative.  
(The two variables together are always jointly significant at a p-value less than 0.01.)  
Hence, the probability of having an IMF program initially increases with per capita GDP 
but later decreases.  The estimated coefficients in column 4 imply that the switch occurs at 
a per capita GDP of $2860 (1985 U.S. dollars), which is above the sample median of $2527.  
The overall marginal effect of per capita GDP at the sample mean of $4481 is estimated to 
be negative.  At that point, an increase in per capita GDP by $1000 is estimated to decrease 
the ratio of IMF lending to GDP by 0.3 percentage point. 
The positive relation between IMF lending and per capita GDP in the low range of 
per capita GDP likely reflects the Fund’s reluctance to provide stabilization loans to 
countries that are not creditworthy.  The negative effect in the upper range of per capita 
GDP likely signals the decreased demand for IMF loans among the rich countries, which 
have other sources of credit.   19 
We find that, after controlling for the log of per capita GDP and its square, the 
dummy for the group of rich OECD countries has negative estimated coefficients in all of 
the specifications.  The estimated value is not statistically significant in columns 1-4 but is 
marginally significant in some cases that we consider later.
14  The negative coefficient on 
the OECD dummy variable can be interpreted as another indicator of a low demand for 
IMF loans by advanced economies. 
The log of total GDP enters as a level and its square.  (Recall that we include these 
variables mainly to be sure that the IMF quota and staff variables are not just proxies for 
the scale of an economy.)  The estimated coefficients are, in each case, positive for the 
level of log(GDP) and negative for the square.  The two coefficients are jointly marginally 
significant in some cases, with p-values ranging from 0.04 in column 4 to 0.85 in column 2.  
Thus, this scale variable appears not to be very important in the determination of IMF loan 
size as a ratio to GDP.  These variables turn out to be statistically more significant in some 
of the systems for IMF program participation and approval. 
The results in columns 2-4 of Table 3 indicate that the political-economy variables 
are important overall for explaining IMF lending decisions.  When considered jointly, the 
p-values for the statistical significance of these variables is between 0.0003 (column 4) and 
0.014 (column 2)—see the line marked as p-value (a) in the table.  If we consider the group 
of these variables exclusive of the bilateral trade share with the United States, then the  
p-values range from 0.0013 (column 4) to 0.048 (column 2)—see the line marked as  
p-value (b). 
                                                 
14 No substantial changes occur in the main results if we exclude the OECD dummy variable in the various 
systems.    20 
In column 4, the economic proximity to the United States, as gauged by bilateral 
trade, and the IMF quota share each have individually significantly positive estimated 
effects at the 5% critical level.  The estimated coefficients on the U.N. voting variable with 
the United States and the IMF staff share are also positive and individually significant at 
the 10% level.  
The estimated coefficients in column 4 imply that an increase in the log of the IMF 
quota share by 1.24 (its standard deviation) raises the IMF loan size by 1.9 percent of GDP.   
An increase in the log of the IMF staff share by 1.26 (the variable’s standard deviation) is 
estimated to raise IMF lending by 0.4 percent of GDP.   
The results also indicate that IMF lending tends to increase when a country has high 
political and economic proximity to the United States.  An increase in the U.N. voting 
variable for the United States by 0.48 (its standard deviation) is estimated to raise the ratio 
of IMF lending to GDP by 0.4 percentage point.  Similarly, an increase in the intensity of 
trade with the United States by 1.5 (its standard deviation) is estimated to raise the ratio by 
0.4 percentage point.  
Column 5 modifies the specification from column 4 to measure the U.N. voting and 
trade intensity variables in relation to the IMF’s major European shareholders, rather than 
the United States.  The U.N. voting and bilateral trade variables are now averages for 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  The estimated coefficient on the U.N. variable 
for Europe is positive and marginally significant.  The estimated effect of the European 
trade variable is also positive but less statistically significant.
15  
                                                 
15 We report here only the results when the U.N. voting and trade variables are averages for the three   21 
Column 6 includes U.N. voting and trade intensity variables for the United States 
together with those for the average of the European countries.  In this setting, only the U.S. 
trade intensity variable is individually statistically significant.  However, the joint 
significance of the political-economy variables is clear—the p-value is 0.0008 for all six 
variables and 0.014 for the four variables exclusive of the two trade intensity measures. 
Figure 1 shows graphically the effect of each explanatory variable on the ratio of 
IMF lending to GDP, based on the estimation results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.  Since 
the responses refer to a one-standard-deviation change of each explanatory variable, the 
figure can be used to gauge the relative importance of each variable in influencing the size 
of IMF loans.   
For example, based on column 4 of Table 3, a reduction in international reserves (by 
one standard deviation or 2.9 months of imports) raises IMF lending by 0.5 percent of GDP.  
A decline in GDP growth (by one standard deviation or 0.035) increases the IMF loan-to-
GDP ratio by 0.5 percentage point.  An increase in the log of per capita GDP (by one 
standard deviation or 4.7, starting from the sample mean) generates a reduction in the loan 
size by 1.4 percent of GDP.  
Figure 1 also shows the effects from the political-economy variables.  Again using 
the estimates from column 4 of Table 3, an increase in the log of the IMF quota (by one 
standard deviation or 1.24) has a particularly large effect—the loan-to-GDP ratio rises by 
                                                                                                                                                     
European countries.  Since the U.N. voting variables for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are 
highly correlated (correlation coefficients above  0.95), it is hard to disentangle the effects for the individual 
countries.  The correlations between the U.N. voting variables for the United States and for each of the 
European countries is much lower—ranging  from 0.7 to 0.8.  The trade intensity variables are substantially 
less correlated than the voting variables, ranging from 0.03 (between the United States and France) to 0.45 
(between France and Germany).     22 
1.9 percentage point.  The corresponding response to an increase in the log of IMF staff (by 
one standard deviation or 1.26) is by 0.4 percent of GDP.  If a country votes more often 
with the United States in the United Nations (that is, the log of the variable rises by one 
standard deviation or 0.48), then the IMF loan-to-GDP ratio rises by 0.4 percentage point.  
The corresponding effect from a rise in the trade intensity variable for the United States (by 
one standard deviation or 1.50) is an increase by 0.4 percentage point. 
For the European variables, we use the estimates shown in column 5 of Table 3.  If 
a country votes more often with the average of the European countries in the United 
Nations (that is, the log of the variable increases by one standard deviation or 0.35), then 
the IMF loan-to-GDP ratio rises by 0.4 percentage point.  The corresponding effect from a 
rise in the trade intensity variable for Europe (by one standard deviation or 1.0) is an 
increase by 0.3 percentage point. 
Table 4 presents estimation results from the Tobit equations for IMF program 
participation, as specified in equations (3) and (4).  The results are, in most respects, similar 
to those for loan size.  For example, the p-values for joint significance of the political-
economy variables are all below 0.03.  The estimated coefficients on the IMF quota share, 
IMF staff share, and the U.N. voting variable with the United States are all positive and 
individually at least marginally significant in columns 2-4.  The estimated coefficient on the 
U.N. voting variable for Europe is also significantly positive in column 5.  However, the 
trade intensity variables are not statistically significant in the specifications in Table 4.  
Figure 2 illustrates the results graphically.   23 
Table 5 presents the estimation results from the probit equations for the approval of 
IMF programs, as specified in equations (5) and (6).  The results are, in many respects, 
similar to those found in the previous tables for loan size and loan participation.  However, 
the statistical significance of the political-economy variables tends to be less than that 
found before.  For example, in column 4, which uses the U.S. variables for U.N. voting and 
trade intensity, the four political-economy variables are jointly significant with a p-value of 
0.034.  However, if the trade variable is omitted, then the remaining three variables are 




III. Effects of IMF Programs on Economic Growth  
3.1. Methodological Issues 
  A number of previous studies have used cross-country data to assess the effects of IMF 
programs on economic performance, including economic growth, investment, inflation, and 
the balance of payments.  A variety of methodologies have been applied to these evaluations.  
An assessment of the impact of an IMF adjustment program requires an evaluation of 
the performance of program countries in comparison with the performance that would have 
prevailed in the absence of the IMF assistance.  In other words, we have to evaluate whether 
the IMF programs were associated with better or worse economic outcomes than would 
otherwise have occurred.   It is difficult conceptually and practically to construct this 
counterfactual in order to disentangle the effects of IMF programs from those of other factors.   
                                                 
16 The point estimate for the effect of European trade intensity in column 5 is negative—this result is not 
shown in Figure 3.   24 
The basic problem is that IMF program participation is an endogenous choice, as 
shown in the previous section.  Program participation applies to countries that self-select 
themselves based on their economic and political circumstances. 
Many studies have used the “before-after” approach or the “with-without” approach 
to assess the impact of an IMF adjustment program (see the survey in Haque and Khan 
[1998]).  The before-after approach uses non-parametric statistical methods, which compare 
performance during a program with that prior to the program.  Thus, this approach assumes 
that, if not for the program, the performance indicators would have taken their pre-crisis 
values (at least up to random error terms).  We regard this assumption as unreasonable 
because participation in an IMF program typically reflects changed circumstances for a 
country. 
The with-without methodology compares the behavior of key variables in the 
program countries to their behavior in non-program countries, which constitute a control 
group.  Thus, this procedure assumes that only the exogenous imposition of an IMF 
program distinguishes the program countries from the control group.  We regard this 
assumption as untenable, because participation in an IMF program typically reflects 
circumstances that differ between program and non-program countries.  Hence, we believe 
that the before-after and with-without approaches do not adequately address the selection-
bias problem.  
   Following Goldstein and Montiel (1986), a number of studies adopted a new 
approach to assess the economic impact of IMF programs.  This method is called the 
Generalized Evaluation Estimator (GEE).  This approach attempts to correct for the non-  25 
random selection of program countries by using the Heckman selection model.  The GEE 
method first estimates an equation for participation in an IMF program and then calculates 
Heckman’s inverse Mills ratio, which gives an estimated probability of program 
participation.  Then the approach controls for non-random self-selection in the estimation 
of the equations for economic performance by including the inverse Mills ratio in those 
equations.  Thus, this approach tries to control for non-random selection into IMF programs 
by holding fixed a measure of the probability of this selection. 
The GEE method has, according to Haque and Khan (1998), become “the estimator 
of choice in evaluating the effects of Fund-supported adjustment programs.”  This situation 
is surprising because the approach has obvious shortcomings.  The basic problem is that the 
method typically does not include variables in the selection equation that are excluded (on 
reasonable grounds) from the economic-performance equations.  Hence, identification 
depends implicitly on auxiliary restrictions, for example, on assumptions about the 
distributions of error terms and on the exclusion of non-linear terms in the performance 
equations.  Since these auxiliary assumptions tend to be fragile, the inclusion of an inverse 
Mills ratio typically does not provide an adequate correction for selection bias. 
An alternative approach is the classical instrument-variables technique.  If available, 
an instrument that is exogenous to the dependent variable in an economic performance 
equation can be used to control for the endogeneity of IMF lending.  The only reason that 
this method has not been the “estimator of choice” in evaluating IMF or other programs is 
the lack of good instruments.  We believe that our political and institutional analysis of IMF   26 
lending provides good candidates for instruments and, therefore, argues for the use of the 
instrumental-variables technique to evaluate the economic effects of this lending. 
 
3.2. Impacts of IMF Programs on Economic Growth 
In this section we investigate the effects of IMF lending programs on economic 
growth.  The existing literature provides conflicting results on the growth effects of IMF 
programs, depending on the sample and methodology.  According to Haque and Kahn 
(1998), among eleven studies based on the before-after or with-without approach, only one 
found a statistically significant positive impact.  The others found either a zero effect or 
weak positive impacts from IMF programs.  However, given the underlying methodological 
problems, it is unclear what to make of this record.   
Studies based on the GEE method present more diverse results.  Kahn (1990) 
reported that IMF program participation significantly lowered the growth rate in the 
program year, but the adverse effects diminished over time.  Przeworski and Vreeland 
(2000) and Hutchison (2001) found that participation in an IMF program led to sizable 
reductions in output growth.  In contrast, Conway (1994) observed that participation in an 
IMF program significantly raised the growth rate over the one to two years subsequent to 
the program.  Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000) also found statistically 
significant beneficial effects of IMF structural-adjustment programs on economic growth.   
Given the unclear basis for identification in these approaches, it is not surprising that the 
conclusions are so varied.    27 
We assess the effects of IMF program participation on economic growth by 
extending previous work in several ways.  Most importantly, we use an instrumental-
variables approach, using the instruments suggested by our analysis of the determinants of 
IMF lending.  The instruments that we employ are the IMF national staff and quota variables 
and the variables that measure a country’s political and economic proximity to the United 
States and the major European countries.  As discussed before, these proximity variables are 
based on the patterns in U.N. voting and bilateral trade.
17 
Many previous studies used annual data to focus on the impact of IMF program 
participation over relatively short time periods, mostly one or two years.  However, it is 
hard to distinguish long-term growth from business cycles at an annual frequency.   
Therefore, our empirical analysis uses cross-country data at a five-year frequency.  We use 
panel data for over 80 countries, and we utilize the cross-country growth framework that 
has been extensively investigated in the literature (see, for example, Barro [2000]).  After 
controlling for other growth determinants isolated in this previous work, we can assess the 
impact of IMF program participation on growth over the contemporaneous five-year period 
and for the subsequent five-year period.   
Since the general approach has been described in previous studies and is likely to be 
familiar, we provide only a brief discussion.  We include the following variables as 
determinants of the growth rate of per capita GDP:  (1) the log of initial per capita GDP; (2) 
human resources (educational attainment, life expectancy, and fertility); (3) the ratio of 
                                                 
17 We also include a dummy for IMF membership as an additional instrument in order to control for the non-
member countries that were not eligible for IMF loans.  Since there are only three observations for non-
members in the sample, this IMF membership dummy does not play a significant role.    
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investment to GDP; (4) changes in the terms of trade (export prices relative to import 
prices); and (5) institutional and policy variables (government consumption, a subjective 
index of the rule of law, international openness, and inflation).
18  For the measure of 
educational attainment, we use the average years of school attainment of males aged 25 and 
over at the secondary and higher levels.  Government consumption is measured by the ratio 
of government consumption (exclusive of outlays on education and defense) to GDP.  The 
rule-of-law index comes from an evaluation by an international consulting firm that 
provides advice to international investors.  The openness measure is the ratio of exports 
plus imports to GDP, filtered for the usual effect of country size (the logs of population and 
area) on this trade measure.   
Table 6 presents the regressions results.  The dependent variables are the five-year 
growth rates of per capita GDP for the periods 1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, and 
1995-2000.  Estimation is by three-stage least squares, using mostly lagged values of the 
independent variables as instruments (see the notes to Table 6).  Most explanatory variables 
enter significantly with the expected signs.  Initial per capita GDP, fertility, government 
consumption, and inflation are significantly negative.  Schooling, life expectancy, 
international openness, and the growth rate of the terms of trade are significantly positive.  
Some variables, notably the investment ratio, are statistically insignificant in these systems.   
                                                 
18 In a preliminary version of this paper, we also included in the growth equations dummy variables for the 
occurrence of currency and banking crises.  We found, as in Barro (2001), that currency and banking crises 
had significantly negative estimated coefficients in the contemporaneous five-year period.  In the subsequent 
five-year period, the impacts became positive but were smaller in magnitude than the initial effects.  In the 
present analysis, we exclude the currency and banking variables because they are endogenous—that is, they 
would be related to current economic outcomes, such as the rate of economic growth.  Moreover, we lack 
adequate instruments for the currency and banking crisis variables. 
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Our primary interest is in the impact of IMF programs.  We focus on the effects of 
IMF loan size and program participation because these variables seem to be more relevant 
than program approval for the assessment of the effects of IMF programs on economic 
growth. 
Column 1 of Table 6 includes as an independent variable the contemporaneous IMF 
loan size as a ratio to GDP.  Column 2 allows also for a lagged effect.  In the estimation for 
these columns, we include the actual values of current and lagged IMF loan size as a ratio 
to GDP in the instrument lists.  Thus, these results do not take account of the endogeneity 
of IMF lending.   
Column 1 shows that the contemporaneous impact of IMF loan size on growth is 
significantly negative.  The estimated coefficient (-0.257, s.e. =0.062) implies that an 
increase in IMF lending by 1 percent of GDP lowers the growth rate contemporaneously by 
0.26 percentage point per year.  However, our presumption is that this strong inverse 
relation between IMF lending and growth reflects the endogeneity of the lending.   
Column 2 allows for contemporaneous and lagged effects of IMF lending. The 
estimated contemporaneous effect is similar to that in column 1.  The estimated lagged 
effect is also negative, and the estimated coefficient is marginally significant at the 10% 
level (-0.118, s.e.=0.063).  
Columns 3 and 4 include the IMF loan size and program participation together.  The 
idea is that the participation variable would pick up any effect of program involvement that 
was independent of the size of the loan.  In the estimation for these columns, the instrument 
lists include current and lagged IMF program participation along with current and lagged   30 
loan size.  That is, no correction for endogeneity applies.  The regression results show that 
the estimated coefficients on IMF program participation—contemporaneous and lagged—
differ insignificantly from zero.  That is, IMF involvement, independent of loan size, does 
not seem to be relevant for economic growth. 
In columns 5-8, the estimation technique changes to use as instruments the log of 
the IMF staff share, the log of the IMF quota share, the log of the fraction of U.N. votes 
along with the United States and the European countries, and the log of the intensity of 
trade with the United States and the European countries.
19  The actual values 
(contemporaneous and lagged) of IMF loan size and participation are excluded from the 
instrument lists. 
The results in column 5 should be compared with those in column 1.  With the use 
of the instrumental variables, the estimated coefficient on the contemporaneous IMF loan 
size becomes smaller in magnitude than before and is now statistically insignificantly 
different from zero (-0.122, s.e. =0.092).  In column 6, which adds the lagged loan size, the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged value is larger in magnitude than that in column 2 and is 
now individually significant at the 1 percent level (-0.272, s.e.=0.097).  Hence, an increase 
in IMF lending by 1 percent of GDP is estimated to lower the growth rate in the subsequent 
five-year period by 0.27 percentage point per year.   
Hence, where we use the political-economy variables as instruments, we find that 
contemporaneous IMF lending is insignificantly related to growth (although the point 
estimate is still negative).  However, lagged lending has a larger negative effect than before.  
                                                 
19 Columns 5-8 include contemporaneous and lagged values of these variables in the instrument lists. 
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In other words, although it is often argued that an IMF program retards economic growth in 
the short run but improves it in the long run, our instrumental estimates suggest a different 
pattern.  We find that an IMF program may not have much deleterious effect in the short 
run (over a contemporaneous five-year period) but does seem to have a substantial adverse 
effect in the longer run (over the next five years).  
Columns 7 and 8 apply instrumental estimation to the systems that include current 
and lagged IMF program participation.  The point estimates for the participation variables 
are negative, but the estimated coefficients are never statistically significant.  Hence, we 
still find that IMF program involvement does not seem to matter for growth independently 
of the loan size. 
 
IV. Concluding Observations 
We began by taking a political-economy approach to the IMF’s lending decisions.  
Holding fixed a set of standard economic variables, IMF lending was influenced by a 
country’s presence at the Fund, as measured by the country’s share of quotas and 
professional staff.  IMF lending was also sensitive to a country’s political and economic 
proximity to some major shareholding countries of the Fund—the United States, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom.  We measured political proximity by voting patterns in 
the U.N. General Assembly and economic proximity by bilateral trading volumes.  The set 
of political-economy variables was statistically significant overall for explaining the size of 
IMF loans, the frequency of participation in IMF lending programs, and the probability of 
IMF loan approval.   32 
This political-economy analysis of IMF lending practices is of substantial interest 
for its own sake.  However, we also use the results to create a set of instrumental variables 
to use to estimate the effects of IMF lending on economic growth.  If we do not 
instrument—that is, if the instrument lists include the IMF lending variables—then  IMF 
lending is estimated to have a substantial inverse relation to growth in the contemporaneous 
five-year period.  However, this relation likely reflects reverse causation, whereby adverse 
economic conditions generate greater IMF involvement.   
The instrumental estimates indicate that the contemporaneous relation of IMF 
lending to economic growth is statistically insignificant (although the point estimate of the 
coefficient is still negative).  However, IMF lending has a statistically significant negative 
influence on economic growth in the subsequent five-year period.  Therefore, although IMF 
lending may not influence growth a lot in the short run, this lending seems to have a 
substantial adverse effect in the longer run—that is, with a lag on the order of five years. 
We plan further research to assess the effects of IMF lending on other economic 
variables, such as investment, inflation, fiscal deficits, and current-account deficits.  We 
plan also to apply methodologies analogous to the one developed in this study to evaluate 
the economic effects of lending programs by the World Bank and of foreign-aid programs.   33 
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Table 1.  Approval of IMF Programs, Fiscal Years 1970-2000 
Number of programs approved 
(total amount committed under arrangements in million of SDRs) 
 
 
 Stabilization  Programs Structural  Programs  
Period  SBA  EFF   SAF   ESAF/PRGF  Total 
          
1970-1974 82          82 
 (4,913)        (4,913) 
1975-1979 83  7      90 
 (8,091)  (1,895)      (9,945) 
1980-1984 116    26      142 
 (20,520)  (22,692)      (43,213) 
1985-1989  90  3   29   7   129 
 (14,117)  (1,277)  (1,455)  (955)  (17,804) 
1990-1994 79    12  8  27  126 
 (14,974)  (14,479)  (130)  (3,309)  (32,893) 
1995-2000  72  24   1   59   156 
  (83,250) (36,659)  (182)  (6,961) (126,052)
 
 
Notes:  An approval of an IMF program indicates that a new IMF financial arrangement 
was approved for a country in the fiscal year (FY2000 corresponds to the period from May 
1, 1999 to April 30, 2000).  SBA is Stand-by Arrangement, EFF is Extended Fund Facility, 
SAF is Structural Adjustment Facility, and ESAF is the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility.  The ESAF was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 
1999.    
 
Source:  IMF (2000, Appendix Table II-1).   37 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Regressions 
 
 
Variable Mean  Median  σ 
Loan size (ratio to GDP)  0.006  0  0.017 
Participation in IMF stabilization programs (EFF   
and SBA only) 
 
0.187 0  0.282 
Approval of IMF stabilization programs (EFF and 
SBA only) 
 
0.358 0  0.480 
GDP growth rate (lagged)  0.012  0.013  0.035 
International reserves (months of imports)   3.291  2.634  2.866 
Real GDP per capita (1985 U.S. thousand dollars) 4.481  2.527  4.653 
Log(real GDP)  (1985 U.S. million dollars)  9.805  9.551  2.094 
Group of advanced OECD countries  0.179  0  0.384 
IMF quota share (log) 
 
-5.806 -6.162  1.240 
IMF staff share (log)  -5.640  -5.795  1.256 
Political proximity to the United States (log)  -1.433  -1.416  0.479 
Political proximity to major Europe (log)  -0.883  -0.965  0.346 
Intensity of trade with the United States (log)  -3.132  -3.090  1.503 
Intensity of trade with major Europe (log)  -3.412  -3.332  0.980 
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Notes to Table 2 
 
The sample consists of 603 observations for the five five-year periods from 1975 to 
1999.  Loan size is the period average of the ratio of IMF loans to GDP.  Only the EFF and 
SBA loans are included here.  Participation is the fraction of time that a country was in an 
IMF stabilization program in each five-year period.  Approval is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a new IMF stabilization program was approved at any time during each of the 
periods.  Data on GDP come from Summers and Heston (1991), PWT 5.6, and updates 
based on GDP growth rates from the World Bank and IMF.  The group of advanced OECD 
countries consists of countries other than Turkey that have been members of the OECD 
since the 1970s.  The share of IMF staff nationals is the fraction of own nationals in IMF 
economists.  The share of IMF quota is the fraction of each country’s quota in the IMF total.  
Political proximity to the United States is the log value of the fraction of times out of all 
votes that each country voted in the U.N. General Assembly along with the United States.  
Political proximity to major Europe is the average value of the political proximity measures 
for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  Trade intensity with the United States is 
the bilateral trade (exports and imports) between a country and the United States, expressed 
as a ratio to the country’s GDP.  Trade intensity with major Europe is the average value of 
the trade intensity measures for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  All variables 
except the GDP growth rate and the IMF program approval, participation, and loan size are 
the values at the beginning of each period.  The GDP growth rate is the average over the 
previous five-year period.   39 
Table 3.  Determinants of IMF Loan Size 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP growth rate  -0.224 -0.196 -0.159 -0.157 -0.167 -0.164 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) 
International   -0.00205 -0.00184 -0.00186 -0.00188 -0.00194 -0.00176 
reserves  (0.00055) (0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00059) 
GDP per capita  0.0072 0.0056 0.0051 0.0053 0.0060 0.0050 
  (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
GDP per capita  -0.00099 -0.00089 -0.00092 -0.00093 -0.00096 -0.00090 
squared  (0.00023) (0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00024) (0.00025) (0.00024) 
Log(GDP)   0.0067 0.0014 0.0059 0.0057 0.0097 0.0052 
  (0.0060) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) 
Log(GDP) squared  -0.00026 -0.00004 -0.00057 -0.00062 -0.00075 -0.00052 
   (0.00031) (0.00038) (0.00042) (0.00041) (0.00042) (0.00042) 
Group of advanced  -0.0085 -0.0131 -0.0110 -0.0135 -0.0197 -0.0172 
OECD countries  (0.0082) (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0105) (0.0102) 
Log(IMF quota)  -- --  0.0149  0.0149  0.0133  0.0130 
     (0.0049)  (0.0048)  (0.0052)  (0.0050) 
Log(IMF staff)  -- 0.0031 -- 0.0032  0.0029  0.0030 
   (0.0020)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)  (0.0019) 
Political proximity  --  0.0100 0.0090 0.0084  --  0.0036 
to the U.S.    (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055)    (0.0087) 
Political proximity   -- -- -- --  0.0106  0.0076 
to major Europe       (0.0073)  (0.0117) 
Intensity of trade  --  0.0024 0.0023 0.0024  --  0.0025 
with the U.S.    (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)    (0.0011) 
Intensity of trade  -- -- -- --  0.0026  0.0024 
with major Europe       (0.0021)  (0.0020) 
p-value  (a)  -- 0.014  0.0005  0.0003  0.0018  0.0008 
               (b)   0.048  0.0017  0.0013  0.0088  0.014 
Number of obs.  603 603 603 603 603 603 
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Notes to Table 3 
 
The dependent variable is the average of the ratio of the amount of IMF loans (SBA 
and EFF only) to GDP over the five-year periods 1975-1979, 1980-1984,…,1995-1999.  
Tobit estimation with a random-effects specification was applied to the panel data for the 
five five-year periods.  The summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2.  See 
the notes to Table 2 for definitions of variables.  Period dummies are included (not shown).  
Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses.  The p-value (a) 
indicates the significance level associated with the test of the joint hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the included political-economy variables—IMF quota share, IMF staff share, 
U.N. voting variable, and trade intensity variable—are all equal to zero.  The p-value (b) 
applies to the same group of variables except for the trade intensity variable.   41 
Table 4.  Determinants of IMF Program Participation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP growth rate  -2.01 -1.97 -1.60 -1.59 -1.67 -1.64 
  (0.72) (0.72) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) 
International   -0.0306 -0.0298 -0.0292 -0.0298 -0.0308 -0.0292 
reserves  (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
GDP per capita  0.115 0.102 0.096 0.101 0.107 0.095 
  (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
GDP per capita  -0.0180 -0.0173 -0.0176 -0.0178 -0.0180 -0.0172 
squared  (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0044) 
Log(GDP)   0.222 0.192 0.244 0.239 0.299 0.242 
  (0.136) (0.134) (0.140) (0.137) (0.133) (0.136) 
Log(GDP) squared  -0.0082 -0.0078 -0.0133 -0.0140 -0.0165 -0.0136 
   (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0079) 
Group of advanced  -0.14 -0.26 -0.21 -0.30 -0.38 -0.35 
OECD countries  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Log(IMF quota)  --  --  0.165 0.156 0.146 0.140 
      (0.093) (0.092) (0.095) (0.094) 
Log(IMF staff )  -- 0.065 -- 0.062  0.058  0.059 
   (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Political proximity  --  0.185 0.173 0.167  --  -0.016 
to the U.S.    (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)    (0.148) 
Political proximity   -- -- -- --  0.286  0.308 
to major Europe       (0.126)  (0.197) 
Intensity of trade  --  0.0273 0.0254 0.0260  --  0.0288 
with the U.S.    (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0199)    (0.0200) 
Intensity of trade  -- -- -- --  0.017  0.014 
with major Europe       (0.037)  (0.036) 
p-value (a)  --  0.022 0.025 0.013 0.010 0.017 
              (b)    0.022 0.026 0.014 0.009 0.018 
Number of obs.  603 603 603 603 603 603 
 
Note:  Participation is the fraction of time that a country was in an IMF stabilization 
program in each five-year period.  Tobit estimation with a random effects-specification was 
used.  See the notes to Tables 2 and 3 for additional information.   42 
Table 5.  Determinants of Approval of IMF Programs 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP growth rate  -6.43 -6.22 -5.65 -5.61 -5.61 -5.54 
  (2.21) (2.18) (2.29) (2.28) (2.30) (2.28) 
International   -0.101 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.100 -0.092 
reserves  (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
GDP per capita  0.278  0.212 0.2001 0.210  0.263  0.210 
  (0.122) (0.116) (0.118) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) 
GDP per capita  -0.0409 -0.0371 -0.0373 -0.0378 -0.0413 -0.0378 
squared  (0.0126) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0119) 
Log(GDP)   0.77 0.61 0.70 0.67 0.89 0.69 
  (0.37) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Log(GDP) squared  -0.0298 -0.0245 -0.0319 -0.0333 -0.0453 -0.0351 
   (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0215) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0212) 
Group of advanced  -0.61 -0.83 -0.72 -0.85 -1.08 -0.93 
OECD countries  (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) 
Log(IMF quota)  --  --  0.23 0.22 0.26 0.24 
      (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) 
Log(IMF staff )  -- 0.144 -- 0.143  0.146  0.142 
   (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.101)  (0.099) 
Political proximity  --  0.49 0.49 0.46  --  0.13 
to the U.S.    (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)    (0.46) 
Political proximity   -- -- -- --  0.70  0.59 
to major Europe       (0.39)  (0.63) 
Intensity of trade  --  0.110 0.108 0.107  --  0.115 
with the U.S.    (0.059) (0.060) (0.059)    (0.059) 
Intensity of trade  -- -- -- --  -0.029  -0.045 
with major Europe       (0.100)  (0.099) 
p-value (a)  --  0.023 0.044 0.034 0.126 0.074 
              (b)    0.063 0.123 0.096 0.068 0.116 
Number of obs.  603 603 603 603 603 603 
 
Note:  Approval is a dummy variable that equals one if a new IMF stabilization program 
was approved in any year of each of the five-year periods.  Probit estimation with a 
random-effects specification was used.  See the notes to Tables 2 and 3 for additional 
information.   43 
  
Table 6.  Effects of IMF Programs on Economic Growth 
(panel of five 5-year periods for 81 countries over the period 1975-2000) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instruments   Actual values of IMF loan size and  
program participation 
























































































































-- -- --  -0.0035 
(0.0056) 
p-value  0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
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Table 6, Continued 
 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Instruments  IMF quotas and staff, 
political proximity to the U.S. and Europe, 
trade intensity with  the U.S. and Europe  
























































































































-- -- --  -0.0021 
(0.0091) 
p-value  0.188 0.007 0.118 0.015 
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Notes to Table 6 
 
The system has 5 equations, corresponding to the periods 1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-
90, 1990-95, and 1995-2000.  The dependent variables are the growth rates of per capita 
GDP.  Data on GDP through 1992 are from Summers and Heston (1991), Penn World 
Table 5.6.  Figures were updated through 2000 from the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, and the IMF, World Economic Outlook.  The log of per capita GDP and the 
average years of male secondary and higher schooling are measured at the beginning of 
each period.  The log of life expectancy at birth is an average for the previous five years.  
The ratios of government consumption (exclusive of spending on education and defense) 
and investment (private plus public) to GDP, the inflation rate, the total fertility rate, and 
the growth rate of the terms of trade (export over import prices) are period averages.  The 
rule-of-law index is the earliest value available (for 1982 or 1985) in the first equation and 
the period average for the other equations.  The openness measure is the ratio of exports 
plus imports to GDP, filtered for the estimated effects on this measure from the logs of 
population and area.   
Estimation is by three-stage least squares.  Instruments are the actual values of the 
schooling, life-expectancy, openness variable, terms-of-trade variable, dummy variables for 
prior colonial status (which have substantial explanatory power for inflation), and lagged 
values of the log of per capita GDP, the government consumption ratio, the investment ratio, 
and the rule-of-law index.  The actual values of contemporaneous and lagged IMF loan size 
and program participation (when the participation variables are included) are used as 
instruments in columns 1-4.  Columns 5-8 use as instruments the contemporaneous and 
lagged values of the log of the IMF staff share, the log of the IMF quota share, the log of 
the fraction of U.N. votes along with the United States and major Europe, and the log of the 
trade intensity with the United States and major Europe.  The IMF loan size and 
participation variables are not included in these instrument lists.  Individual constants (not 
shown) are included for each period. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The p-
value indicates the significance level associated with the test of the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the IMF program variables included in each column are jointly zero.   46 
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